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Wamer proposes  and estimates  a microeconomic  The decline  in Mexico's international  terms
investment  model  to determine  the relative  of trade was  probably  the most important  ulti-
importance  of three explanations  for Mexico's  mate cause  of the increased  relative  cost of
investment  decline  in the early 1980s:  machinery,  but the reversal  in net capital inflows
to Mexico  probably  also played a role in increas-
• The decline  in oil prices.  ing this relative  price. On this point,  the evidence
is not as clear.
* The termination  of capital  inflows.
After controlling  for these  effects, Wamer
* The effects  of debt overha,-g  and uncer-  finds litle evidence  that  the effects  of debt
tainty.  overhang  and uncertainty  had much to do with
the investment  decline.
He uses investment  data for private  indus-
tries  between 1981  and 1985,  which  have yet to  Warner  points  out that investment  in Texas
be used in addressing  the question  under discus-  and Louisiana  (which  were also riding  the oil
sion.  boom  of 1973-81)  also fell in 1981-86,  and
adverse  commodity  price shocks  also affected
Tne data indicate  that the main microeco-  many  other heavily  indebted  countries.  At the
nomic mechanism  driving lie decline  in invest-  very least, commodity  price shocks (such as
ment was a rise in the relative  price of invest-  Mexico's  decline  in oil prices)  as a direct cause
ment goods  - especially  the relative  price of  of declining  investment  levels in the 1980s  have
machinery  (a traded  good in Mexico).  Moreover,  been  insufficiently  emphasized  in the literature
the decline  in trade (driven  by falling world  oil  on the effects of the international  debt crisis.
prices)  explains  much of the increase  in this
relative  price.
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It is not necessarily  surprising  to learn  that investment  declined  in a country when  the world price
of its key export  declined by about  50 percent. Yet the investment  decline in Mexico  in the early 1980s
is almost universally attributed  to some aspect of the international  debt crisis or to general uncertainty
rather than to the decline  in the price of oil. The possibility  that the oil price decline  would  have reduced
investment  even in the absence of the debt crisis is rarely seriously considered.  Instead, the usual
argument is that the oil price decline helped cause the debt crisis, and then some other phenomena
associated  with  the debt crisis, such as the debt-overhang,  or heightened  uncertainty  about  policy  reforms,
in turn caused the investment  decline.
Sorting out the role of the oil price decline  versus the debt crisis is important  because  the view that
Latin America's economic  problems  in the 1980s  were caused by debt problems is an important  premise
in many  policy discussions. Empirical  studies  attempting  to estimate  the effect of the debt crisis (broadly
defined)  on investment  have only recently  begun to appear: Cohen  (1990), Faini and de Melo (1990),  Fry
(1989),  Hofman  and Reisen (1990),  Sawides (1992)  and Warner  (1992), and so far there is no consensus.
These  studies analyze  entire groups of less developed  countries  and focus on investment  aggregates  from
national  accounts data.  This paper takes a more targeted approach: focussing on a country and a data
set where it is possible to define and estimate  the effects more precisely.
The main focus of this paper is to distinguish  empirically  between  three possible causes
for Mexico's investment  decline in the early 1980s: the oil price decline, the termination of capital
inflows, and debt-overhang/uncertainty  effects. The second goal of the paper is to help fill a gap in the
literature  by providing  structural estimates  of a private sector investment  demand function  in a small open
economy.  It is fortunate that good data are available  for Mexico during a period when the available
instruments  (world oil prices, world interest rates) exhibited  substantial  variation. Thus there may also
be sufficient  statistical information  to try to identify  structural parameters.
1The data are from  &  sector  -level  investment  survey conducted  in MexicG  between  the first quarter
of 1981  and the last  quarter of 1985, which has not yet received  much  attention. This data set has several
virtues: it spans  the crucial debt-crisis  year of 1982, is of fairly high quality, permits explicit  controls  for
industry-specific  investment  determinants  such as relative product  prices and wages, and permits a focus
on industries  which are in the private sector.
I begin with an assumption  that concedes  ground to the debt crisis side of this debate.  That is,
I will assume that the sudden termination  of international  capital flows to Mexico, which happened  in
1982, was exogenous  instead of being caused by the continued  decline in the price of oil, which began
in the middle of 1981. This assumption  will lead to an underestimate  of the magnitude  of the oil price
effect, because it rules out any effect of the oil price decline working  through the capital flow variable.
The paper will show that despite  this assumption,  the data suggests  that the effect of the oil price decline
was large.
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 sur eys the main facts for Mexico.  Section 3
presents a micro-economic  investment  model.  Section 4 spells out how the terms of trade decline and
the debt crisis relate to this investment  model.  Section 5 discusses the data and econometric issues.
Sections  6 and 7 present results using quarterly and annual data, respectively. Section  8 concludes.
2. Important Dates and Movements  in Key variables
Mexico's  debt problems  in 1982  are usually  attributed  to the combined effect of high world real
interest  rates, falling  oil prices, and an inability  of Mexican  policy  makers  and their international  creditors
to adjust to these new realities.  The main facts are as follows.  Between 1980 and 1982, world real
interest rates were very high by any measure.  In July of 1981, world oil prices began to decline. In
February of  1982, Mexico devalued the peso by 46 percent and devalued again in August of 1982.
Throughout early  1982, macro economic reforms were  repeatedly announced but  only  partially
implemented. Through July of 1982, international  creditors were still lending heavily to Mexico. On
2August 12, 1982,  Mixic6 announced  to the sii'prise of the ifiternational  comxztinity  that it could  not meet
its short term obligations  falling due in the coming week.  By 1983, new capital inflows had virtually
stopped, Mexico  was transferring  resources abroad, and investment  and growth were sharply lower than
the levels achieved  in 1980 and 1981.
The investment  decline after 1981 was severe by any measure.  Real investment  data from the
national  accounts  show that average annual real investment  in the period 1983-1985  was 63 percent of
the 1981 level, and the decline was roughly similar for public and private investment.  The same
calculation  using the investment  survey data puts this number  at 53 percent.
Apart from debt crisis effects, the two key exogenous  variables this paper considers to explain
this decline are the terms of trade and net capital inflows.' The capital inflow variable is the sum of net
capital inflows  from the capital  account (not including  changes  in official  reserves) net interest payments,
and errors and omissions, all measured in billions of dollars and all deflated  by the U.S producer price
index (1982=  1.0).2  In 1981, net capital inflows averaged  $1.8 billion per quarter; in 1985, there was
a net outflow averaging  $3.0 billion per quarter.
The terms of  trade, defined as the  ratio of  export prices to  import prices, also declined
substantially  during this period. Driven by the decline in the world price of oil, the terms of trade fell
by almost 30 percent between 1981  and 1985 (using annual averages),  and then fell a further 23 percent
in  1986.  The decline in the terms of trade started in the middle of 1981, clearly preceding the debt
I The assumption  that capital flows were exogenous is made more for the sake of the argument  than
for realism. The capital flow reversal was probably caused in part by the continuing  fall in the price of
oil as well as the sudden questioning  of Mexico's solvency  by its creditors.  In contrast, the assumption
that Mexico's terms  of trade decline  was exogenous  is easier to defead because  world oil prices were the
key variable driving this index and Mexico only produced  about 4 percent of world oil output.
2 By including  the errors and omissions in this measure of capital flows, I follow numerous studies
in assuming that this primarily measures unrecorded private capital flight rather than other errors
(Anthony and Hughes-Hallett  (1992) is a useful survey of possible capital flight measures).  Casual
inspection  of the data during 1981-1982, when capital flight was known to be extensive, support this
assumption.
3problems  of August,  1982.
43. The micro model  of investment.
This section presents a microeconomic investment model to  organize the analysis, and the
following section relates the exogenous variables to  this model.  I choose a baseline model which
highlights  the impact  of relative price movements  on investment  partly because  the data are available  but
also because  adverse  relative price movements  provide  the main alternative  explanation  for the investment
decline. Investment  data is available  at the sector level, and hence the model .s of a representative  firm
at this level. There is a neoclassical  constant  returns to scale production  function, F(K,L), and a convex
internal  adjustment  cost function,  C(I), which measures  adjustment  costs in terms of the investment  good.
The firm is assumed  to be a price-taker in product, factor and financial  markets, and to know  the values
of future exogenous  variables.'
The firm's problem is to choose investment  and employment  to maximize  the present discounted
value of future cash flows.  Whenever  possible, time and sector subscripts are suppressed.
(1)  Max  f  e  [pF(K,L) - wL - ptC(p  ] ds
(52)  ist.  k  = i  - 8K
where r is the real interest rate, p is the product price, w is the wage rate, and p' is the price of capital
goods. The solution  to this problem, obtained by maximizing  the current valued Hamiltonian,  includes
the following  four equations.
(3)  p FL(K,L) = w
I These assumptions  are made to solve and motivate  the investment  model.  The empirical section
allows for a less-restrictive  set of assumptions  and other determinants  of investment  not in this model.
5(4)  - pI C/I)  =  q-  X
(5)  q  - (r+6)q - -p FK(IL)
(6)  lm  q  O
Equation (3) equates the marginal product of labor with the real product wage.  Equation (4)
states that investment  is chosen up to the point where the marginal  cost equals q, which represents  the
increment  to the value of the firm from a unit change in investment. After integrating  equation (5), q
can be expressed  as the present discounted  value of future marginal  value products of capital, discounted
at the rate r+6.  Note that higher wages depress investment  demand by reducing L, from (3), which in
turn reduces  the marginal  product of capital and therefore q, in equations (5) and (4).
To obtain  a closed  form investment  equation  one needs  simplifying  assumptions  on the functional
forms of C(.) and F(.).  With these in hand, the solution  procedure is to substitute  optimal  employment,
L, from equation (3) into equation  (5) and then integrate  eouation (5) forward from t to co using (6), the
no bubbles condition.
To provide an explicit investment  function, I first assume a Cobb-Douglas  production  function,
F(K,L) = KI L'-.  This assumption  yields a simple and tractable  expression for q:
(7)  q  = A  6W
r+8
where A = e(o-1)('+  and 0 =  1/ax  >  1.
6Substituting  (7) into (4), and assuming  a quadratic  investment  cost function 4, C(I) = 1 2/2, yields
an investment  function which is increasing in p, and decreasing in w, (because 0> 1, and therefore 1-
0<O), r+b,  and p.
(8)  1 = A  P  M1
p (r+8)
There is data on investment,  product  prices, and wages which varies across sectors and time; data on the
price of investment  goods and interest rates which varies across time only, and no data on depreciation.
Therefore, I will estimate  a version  of equation  (8) whiich  is modified  to accommodate  the available  data.
That is, depreciation  will be suppressed,  and the constant, A, will be allowed to differ across sectors to
pick up differences in technology, sector size, or anv other sector specific but time invariant variable.
Letting "j" denote sectors and "t" quarters, I will estimate  an equation similar to the following:
)2  1.
(9)  If  iPjt  Wit
(Psl)  '4r"
The key issue to discuss now is how exogenous  variables such as the terms of trade and capital
inflows, and a mi-re  general phenomena  such as the debt crisis relate to equation (9).  1 will distinguish
three possibilities  which are not mutually  exclusive. The first possibility  is that the terms of trade decline
caused  the investment  decline  by affecting  the prices on the right hand side of (9). The second  possibility
4  From equation (4), a cost function with a positive second derivative will deliver the result that
investment  increases in q and decreases in p': the quadratic functional  form is not essential for this.
Including  K or L in the investment  cost function  would make it difficult  to obtain a closed form solution
for investment.
7is that the debt crisis caused  the investment  decline by affecting  the prices on the right hand side of (9).
The third possibility  is that the debt crisis caused the investment  decline  by working through a variable
that is not present on the right hand side of (9).
84. The mechanisms  behind  the terms of trade and debt effects.
This section will specify  the channels  through which I allow  the debt crisis and the terms of trade
decline  to affect the investment  equation (9) above. Briefly, the terms of trade and capital inflow effects
are indirect. They work through the prices on the right of (9), using a demand and supply framework
familiar from Dutch Disease models. 5 Other debt crisis effects such as the debt overhang affect
investment  more directly, and are tested by adding  debt-crisis  proxies to the right of (9). The rest of this
section  explains the reasoning in more detail.
There is first of all a direct and obvious relationship  between the terms of trade and prices in
export and import sectors.  Because  the terms of trade is measured as p'/p m, shocks to world export
prices will induce a positive correlation between domestic export prices and the terms of trade, and
shocks  to import prices will induce  a negative  correlation. 6
Apart from this direct relationship between the terms of trade variable and prices in traded
sectors, a terms of trade improvement  represents  an increase  in wealth which may stimulate  demand  and
therefore affect product prices in non-traded  sectors. This kind of effect is familiar from Dutch Disease
models (for example, Neary and Van Wijnbergen, 1986) where a rise in the terms of trade raises
spending  or, home  goods  and increases  the relative price of non-traded  goods. Capital  flows are assumed
to shift demand in a similar fashion.  These assumptions lead to the following demand and supply
equations  for any given product market, indexed  by the "j" subscript.
I The model here is like an open economy model where the domestic interest rate is given by the
world interest  rate and therefore shifts to the savings  function  from exogenous  changes  in capital  inflows
do not have a direct effect on investment,  but may have an indirect  effect through prices.  Although  the
basic model here does not allow capital inflows to directly affect investment,  I test for this possibility  in
the empirical section.
6  The terms of trade index was computed  by the Bank of Mexico using international  (dollar) prices
of Mexico's main imports and exports.  These prices are distinct from the sectoral value added prices,
pj, also used in this paper.
9(10)  pj  = d( yj,  P  , CF) p 
(11)  p1 = S(  y  ,  w1 )
In equations  (10) and (11), p is the product price, y is output, p'/p  is the terms of trade, CF is
the capital flow variable and w is the wage.  The sectoral wage in turn is determined in the simplest
possible neoclassical  labor market, described by equations (12) and (13) below.  Labor demand is an
implicit function  of the product  price and the wage.
(12)  wj = d( pj,  LJ)
And labor supply is an implicit function  of the consumer  price index and the wage.
(13)  WJ  = s( CPI , LJ )
Equations  (10)  to (13) can be solved to obtain reduced  form equations  relating  prices and wages
to the terms of trade, the capital flow variable, and the CPI.
(14)  PJ = g(  Px,  CF,  CPI)
p tm
(15)  wJ = h( P  , CF, CPI )
10The important  point for this paper is just to establish  that such reduced forms exist, in order to
motivate  regressions  of prices and wages on the terms of trade and capital flows. A possibly confusing
point is that the estimated regressions have pj/CPI and wj/CPI on the left rather than pj and wj as in
equations  (14) and (15), implicitly  assuming  that the functions  are homogenous  with respect to the CPI.
Furthermore, because  it happens not to matter for the main  points, the reported  regressions  use weighted
average product prices and wages, Ewjp/CPI and rjwj/CPI,  on tho left, where the co are investment
shares. If reduced  forms exist for sectoral prices, they also exist for functions  of sectoral prices such as
these price indexes. I do arbitrarily assume a log-linear  functional  form.
The expected  sign of a(pj/CPI)/a(p/pm)  depends on the nature of the sector. If pj is the price of
a non-traded  product, a decline in p', holding  pmconstant, should  depress demand  and non-traded  prices.
Given that the market basket of the CPI has  a  high non-traded component, both  numerator and
denominator  of pj/CPI should  be affected  similarly, and thus a regression  of p/CPI on p'/pm  should yield
a coefficient  that is close to zero.
If pj is the price of imported  machinery, and the price of oil exports falls, the denominator  should
be depressed  but not the numerator, yielding a negative  coefficient. If pj is the product  price of a non-oil
export sector, and the price of oil exports falls, the same thing should happen. Of course, if pj is oil,
both numerator and denominator should be depressed, yielding an  ambiguous but probably small
coefficient.  Since the capital flow variable is also modelled as a demand shifter, the same kind of
reasoning  also applies  for its effects on p/CPI.
This section  now turns to a brief discussion  of the debt theories. It is important  to remember  that
the main triggering  mechanism  for these theories is the perception that the country is not solvent  rather
than simply  the level of debt. The theories argue that this shift in sentiment  lead to several  other factors
which directly depressed investment. Therefore, this paper considers proxies for Mexico's perceived
11creditworthiness  by the international  financial  community  to test these theories. 7
Krugman (1988) and Sachs (1988)  advanced  the idea that the debt overhang can account for the
investment  decline. Following  the terminology  in Krugman  (1988), a debt-overhang  is said to exist when
the expected  present value of future resource transfers is less than the face value of the extemal debt.
The argument presumes that a debt-overhang  creates a situation where creditors can siphon off some of
the additional  output resulting  from investment. In this situation a social planner would invest less due
to the implicit tax levied by foreign creditors.  This is the formal mechanism  linking high debt to low
investment  in the models  of Sachs (1988), Krugman  (1988), Froot (1988), and Bulow  and Rogoff (1989),
although  the last two papers do not necessarily  advocate  the debt-overhang  view.
A related argument is that the overhang  caused  the termination  in lending  by foreign commercial
banks.  In Sachs (1988), the passage of a country from solvency to a debt-overhang  places indebted
countries  in a situation analogous  to a domestic insolvent  firm.  Lending  is restricted  essentially  because
semi-insolvency  exacerbates  creditor-debtor  agency problems.
Krugman (1988) and Helpman (1988) also argue that a debt overhang causes investors to fear
higher investment taxes.  Ize  (1989) and  Rodrik  (1989) stress that  the  debt crisis  introduced
unprecedented  policy  uncertainty. Dixit (1989), and Rodrik (1989), following  ideas in Bernanke  (1983)
and Cukierman (1980) argue that even in the absence of risk aversion, it may be optimal to postpone
investments  in the face of greater uncertainty,  because  the decision may be irreversible,  and uncertainty
may resolve itself with the passage of time.
The evidence  suggests that there was an important  shift in perceptions  of Mexico's solvency in
the late Summer of 1982.  Solis and Zedillo (1985) report that Mexico's solvency  was first questioned
during negotiations  for a 2.5 billion dollar "jumbo" loan  to the Mexican  government  in June 1982. The
I Fry (1989) and Cohen (1990) test specifications  with the debt stock on the right; Savvides  (1990)
also argues against such practice. In this paper, the debt stock is used in annual regressions, but not in
the quarterly regressions  since the data are not readily available.
12issue of the Economist  magazine  published  just after the August  incident reports that creditors were still
lending  heavily  to Mexico in the spring of 1982. Earlier issues of the Economist in 1982  fail to mention
Mexico's impending  payments problems. Furthermore, the price of a Mexican government  bond, and
the price of the "Mexico  Fund" stock, both of which were traded on the New York Stock Exchange  at
this time, did not exhibit any unusual  decline until  the week of the August announcement,  suggesting  that
Mexico's problems were not anticipated by the  international financial community.  Contemporary
accounts  such as Kraft (1985) attest to the surprise caused by the August announcement.
5.Data and Econometric  issues.
The investment  data analyzed  here is a sub-sample  from a larger data set developed  from a firm-
level investment  survey conducted  by the Bank of Mexico  between 1981 and 1985. This larger data set
was published  in the Bank of Mexico's monthly  publication  Indicadores  Economicos  in more aggregated
form (9 sectors rather than 68) during 1987 and 1988.  The more disaggregated  data used here was
obtained  from the intemal files of the Bank of Mexico  during a personal visit by the author. This data
set is not well known  outside of Mexico and has not yet been examined  at this level of disaggregation  in
print.  The key features  of the data set are as follows.
*  Real investment  spending:  constant 1970  pesos.
*  4 kinds of  investment goods: tr.msport equipment, machinery and operating
equipment,  buildings  and structures, and office furniture and equipment.
*  68 sectors, mostly mining and manufacturing.
*  20 quarters: 1981:1 to  1985:4.
*  Coverage  includes  56,053  public  and  private  firms;  does  not  include
"maquiladora"  or  "in-bond" firms operating in tariff-free export enclaves; does not
include  Agriculture, Forestry or Fishing.
The sub-sample  I analyze  excludes  sectors in which public enterprises  are dominant, and restricts
attention  to machinery  investment. This selection  permits  a focus  on private sector behavior, and permits
13a focus on a relatively homogenous  investment  good.5 All sectors with more than 25 percent of output
produced by public enterprises in 1980 were eliminated, reducing  the number of sectors in the sample
from 68 to 48.  Another 6 sectors were eliminated for lack of price data, leaving 42 sectors in the
sample. This final sample represents 61 percent of all private investment  in the sample and 21 percent
of public and private investment.
Turning back briefly to the full data set, investment  declined in virtually all (65 of 68) of the
sectors between 1981 and 1985, and typically was quite severe.  Simple correlations  do not reveal any
statistically  significant  association  between  the investment  decline  and ownership  status (public/private);
nor any significant  association between the investment  decline and import or export shares.  The only
significant  s.mple association  I found is that sectors with high machinery  shares in investment  in 1981
also tended to experience  more severe investment  declines after 1981.
The other key variables are listed and described briefly in table 1.  The price indexes  measure
the price for value added, and the wage indexes measure the mean cost of a man-hour  of labor in the
sector.  The  interest rate  is the  three-month government bond rate  (CETES in  Mexico) minus
contemporaneous  CPI inflation. Many other measures  of real interest rates were tried in the regressions
but not reported in table I to save space. MEXB is the ratio of the price of a Mexican government  bond
to a risk-free bond  with the same  coupon and maturity. 9 MEXF is the stock price of the "Mexico  Fund"
mutual fund, traded on the New York Stock Exchange.  MEXCW is Institutional  Investor's index of
Mexico's perceived  creditworthiness  by major U.S. banks (a higher value means the country is more
' Machinery  investment  is by far the largest spending category in this data set (about 75 percent of
the total). Earlier  versions  of this paper included  analysis  of separate investment  equations  for machinery
investment  and all other investment. The output was much  more complex but the main conclusions  were
similar.
9  The risk-free bond price was calculated by the author as the present discounted  value (using the
average interest rate on 10-year U.S. government bonds for a given quarter) of the Mexican bond's
payment  stream (the coupon was 8.125 percent and the bond  matured in December 1997). The Mexican
bond price was obtained from Standard  and Poors.
14creditworthy)." 0
The simple  movements  in the data are as follows. Real  product  prices do not change substantially
during the 1981 to 1985 period; however real wages fall by about 30 percent on average; and the real
price of machinery  rises by more than 30 percent.  Real domestic interest rates decline during the high
inflation  quarters around 1982  but rise back towards zero by the end of the sample."  The three debt
crisis proxies, MEXB, MEXF. and MEXCW, all are fairly flat before the Summer of 1982, and then
plunge  precipitously  around August 1982. After 1982, MEXB rises steadily up to the end of the sample
in 1985, while the other two variables remain depressed throughout  the period.
The equations to be estimated  are log linear versions of the investment  equation, (9), and the
reduced  form price and wage equations,  (14) and (15). Recall that product prices, p, machinery  prices,
p', and wages, w, are all scaled by the CPI.
(16)  lnQ)jt  = toj  + ajDt  + CL 2 1n(p),t  + a3In(w)jt + ce 4ln(p,  + ar,  + eij
(17)  ln(pbar),  =  +0 +  X 1ln(')l  +  22CFt  +  E2
p 
1' Institutional  Investor asks about 90 banks to grade countries on a 0 to  100 scale, with 100
representing the lowest chance of default, and then weigbts the responses by size of exposure and
analytical  sophistication  of the bank's country analysis  system.  These ratings are published  twice every
year, and linear interpolation  was used to obtain quarterly numbers.
" Two other measures of expected inflation: one using fitted values from an AR(4) equation; the
other using the average of two leads of inflation,  yielded similar data on real interest rates.  It is difficult
to argue that negative  real interest rates  during this period reflect  government  controls  on nominal  interest
rates because a significant fraction of government bonds were sold on the open market to  private
investors.
15(18)  ln(wbar), = eo + eln(AX),  + 02CFt + e t
p
(19)  In(p%)  = P 0 + P1ln(Px), + P 2CFt +  s4,
p 
Note that there is a separate equation, (19), for machinery  prices and that (17) and (18) have the
averages of pi, and w;, across sectors on the left rather than the actual pj, and wj, (these are weighted
averages  using investment  shares for weights). This simplifies  the presentation. Both (17) and (18) were
estimated  sector by sector, but nothing essential in the argument is lost by reporting results from the
simpler framework  above. Note also that D, in  : ¢-)  stands for any of the four debt-crisis  proxies, and
that quarterly dummies  were included in the estimation  of (16) but not shown above.
Equations  (16) through (19) make explicit that the effect of the terms of trade on investment  is
indirect, operating  through product prices, wages and the machinery  price.  The debt crisis is allowed
to affect investment  in two ways. First, the capital flow variable  affects investment  indirectly  by affecting
the relative prices. Second, debt-overhang  and/or uncertainty are allowed to affect investment  directly
in equation (16).
The model underlying  equations  (16) through (19) treats the terms of trade, capital flows  and the
domestic  interest rate as exogenous, and has a recursive structure.  Although  the recursive nature of the
model may be used to defend least squares estimation  of the investment  equation, there are also good
reasons to doubt whether this is the best approach.  There could be standard supply and demand
simultaneity  between  investment  and either the machinery  price or the domestic  interest rate. There may
also be a relationship  between an unobserved variable in the investment equation and wages.  For
16example,  the euphoria  surrounding  the oil boom in Mexico  may have been associated  with both an extra
stimulus  to investment  and wage bonuses or other implicit rent sharing arrangements  with labor.
I will use three instruments in an attempt to deal with this issue: the terms of trade, the capital
flow variable, and the LIBOR interest  rate.  The first two instruments  are clearly  suggested  by the model
above. It also seemed  natural to include  an international  interest  rate to instrument  for a domestic  interest
rate. 12 With three instruments,  the estimates of (16) treating three variables as endogenous,  namely the
machinery  price, wages and the interest rate, are exactly  identified.
The reported regressions in table 2 have an error structure that was determined  through some
preliminary  examination  of the residuals.  First, a Bartlett test overwhelmingly  rejected the hypothesis
that the error variances  were equal for each sector. Second,  separate Durbin-Watson  statistics  computed
for each of the 42 sectors were either close to  2 or  were in the inconclusive range.  Somewhat
surprisingly, only 3 of the 42 Durbin-Watson  statistics  provided  evidence  for positive serial correlation
(the regressions in table 2 report the average Durbin-Watson  statistic across all sectors).  Third, the
sample correlations  over time of the residuals in all 42*41/2 pairs of sectors were examined  and only
about 5 percent were even above 0.45  in absolute value.  In sum, there was strong evidence for
heteroscedasticity  but not very strong evidence  for other  departures  from a diagonal  error structure:  hence
weighted  least squares  estimates will be reported below.
6. Results,
Table 2 presents instrumental  variables estimates  of the investment  equation (16).  The dummy
variable  D, is a crude  proxy to catch debt-crisis  effects; it is coded  to equal one after the second quarter
of 1982,  and therefore  should have a negative  sign. MEXB  measures  the creditworthiness  of the Mexican
government as perceived by the international  financial community,  and should have a positive sign.
12Several  forms  of the interest parity relationship  imply  that international  interest  rates can be treated
as instruments  for domestic interest rates.
17MEXE is an index of stock prices for Mexican  companies and should also carry a positive sign.  And
MEXCW is an index  of creditworthiness  for Mexico as a whole, and should again have a positive sign.
All of these are interpreted as imperfect, but still informative, indicators of debt-overhang and/or
uncertainty.
Of these four debt variables, only one (the  dummy  variable  DJ)  is significant  and has the negative
sign predicted by the debt theories, while the other three are insignificant, and among these, the
coefficient  on MEXB has the wrong sign.  These results do not support either a complete rejection or
acceptance  of the various debt hypotheses,  but on balance  cast doubt on their importance.
It is worth noting four additional points about the debt variables.  First, the debt dummy is
arguably  the most crude way to measure debt overhang effects, and yet it is the only one which shows
significant  debt effects. Second, although  the crudeness of the variable is an issue, in defence  of the debt
theories, the estimated  effect is large. The coefficient  of -.83 indicates  that ceteris paribus, this variable
can account for 70 percent (-.83/-1.18) of the investment  decline in the sample." 3 Third, fear of higher
investment  taxes to solve government solvency problems is one of the main mechanisms offered to
explain the precise transmission  from debt problems  to investment. Yet, the most precise indicator  of
perceived solvency of the Mexican government, MEXB, is also the worst performer of all the debt
variables. Fourth, MEXCW is arguably the best measure  to capture international  credit rationing  effects
since it comes from direct surveys  of country  risk perceptions  by major international  banks, but it is not
significant  either.
To check further the significance  of the dummy variable, the investment  sample was restricted
to the eight largest exporting sectors (sectors which sold more than 10 percent of their output outside
Mexico  in 1980). One version  of the debt-overhang  hypothesis  in Sachs (1988)  states  that investment  fell
" Note however that three-stage  least squares estimates  of the same equation produced a somewhat
smaller coefficient  of -0.63 (0.43).
18because  exporters  feared expropriation  of their output by foreign creditors. While it is unclear whether
this effect can have a large impact  on total investment  in a country which exported at most 20 percent
of output, it may still be expected  to have a larger effect on sectors that export than those that do not.
However, when the model in column 2 of table 2 was re-estimated on these eight sectors, the debt-
overhang  effect as measured  by this dummy  was actually smaller (-0.425, se=0.784)."
While the results in table 2 cast some doubt on the importance  of debt crisis effects stressed in
the literature, they also point  to a major effect that has not been emphasized. The most important  result,
both in terms of size, statistical  significance,  and robustness  across specifications,  is the large estimated
machinery  price elasticity, which ranges from -1.68 to  4.75.15 Since the relative price of machinery
rose by about  40 percent  over the sample  period, this is an important  microeconomic  channel  behind  the
investment  decline, perhaps the single most important  channel.
Another result in table 2 that seems robust across specifications  is the positive elasticity on the
product  price variable  of about 1.0, although  sometimes this is not significant. It should be mentioned
that the regression is controlling  for changes in the prices of intermediate  inputs through this variable
since  the prices are value added prices." 6
It is hard to draw reliable  conclusions  about  the remaining  two variables:  wages and real interest
"'  The other estimated  coefficients,  on p, w, p', and r, were 1.52 (1.66), -2.86 (5.14), -6.00 (3.74),
and -0.013 (0.010).
1" The low value of -1.68 comes from the regression where the debt crisis proxy, ln(MEXB), is
statistically  insignificant  and has the wrong sign.  Of the regressions with correctly signed debt crisis
proxies, the range is -2.58 to 4.75.  One reason that the regression with MEXB differs from the other
regressions  is that MEXB is not highly collinear with the other debt crisis proxies.  It measures  market
sentiment  about  the Mexican  government's creditworthiness  rather than that of the entire country. This
variable  rose during 1984-1985,  whereas the other debt crisis proxies remained  depressed.
16  On the issue  of whether  to treat the price variable as endogenous,  I found that the residuals  from
the price regression (equation  17 with p, on the left) had virtually  zero correlation  with investment  or the
residuals  from the investment  equation, suggesting  that endogeneity  is not an issue.  Regressions  that
nevertheless  treat the price variable  as endogenous  yield large negative  price coefficients  with extremely
high standard  errors.
19rates. The wage variable switches signs across specifications  and is typically not significant. It is only
significant  once MEXB is included in the regression, but MEXB itself has the wrong sign and is not
significant.
The estimated real interest rate coefficients  range from about zero to -0.0045.  The -0.0045
estimate  means  that a percentage  point increase  in real interest rates would reduce the log of investment
by 0.0045, and thus would reduce investment  by 0.45 percent.  This effect seems fairly small: if real
interest rates rose by 20 percentage  points, the -0.0045 estimate predicts that investment  would decline
by only 9.4 percent.  While there are reasonable objections  to the simple measure  of real interest rates
used in this regression, alternative  measures  yielded smaller estimated  effects. 17
The estimates  in table 2 also facilitate a more precise quantitative  assessment  of the impacts of
the right-hand-side  variables  on the investment  decline. Two of the right hand side variables, real product
prices and real interest rates, did not change enough  between 1981  and 1985  to have been major players
in explaining  the investment  decline, whatever  their estimated  coefficients. Of the other variables, real
machinery  prices rose by about 30 percent and real wages fell by about 30 percent. The wage effect is
not reliably  estimated  and thus will not be stressed. In contrast, the machinery  price effect seems reliable
and important.  Taking the smallest estimated coefficient from table 2 of -1.68, the observed rise in
machinery  prices  can explain 46 percent (-1.68*0.324/-1.18)  of the investmnent  decline;  taking the largest
estimated  coefficient,  it can explain 130 percent. The evidence  therefore marks out machinery  prices as
an important  channel of transmission  to investment.
Table 3 presents the estimates of equations (16) - (19).  The estimates of the product price
equation (16) offer no evidence  that the terms of trade decline  or the capital flow reversal affected real
17 A proxy for expected  inflation  was calculated  using one-step-ahead  forecasts  from an AR(4)  time
series regression:  the estimated  coefficient  was -0.0018 (0.0007). A proxy for the return on holding  U.S.
bonds  was also constructed  using data  on the 3-month  futures  premium  for the Mexican  Peso (an indicator
of expected devaluation),  and U.S. 3-month  treasury bill rates: the estimated coefficient was -0.0029
(0.0012).
20product prices.  On the other hand, there is evidence that the terms of trade reduction depressed real
wages.  The absence of any effect on product prices probably indicates that there is little difference
between the traded goods content of the product price indexes in the numerator, and the CPI in the
denominator. In 1980,  the sectors covered by this data exported only about 6 percent of their output  on
average.
Table 3 provides strong evidence  that the terms of trade decline served to increase  the relative
price of machinery  and somewhat weaker evidence that the capital flow reversal had a similar effect.
While Mexico sold only a small fraction of its non-oil output abroad during this period, at least 50
percent of machinery  investment  in Mexico  was imported. Mexico  was a price-taker in the world market
for traded machinery. Therefore, a demand  contraction  caused  by the oil price decline  could  be expected
to reduce the CPI, with its high non-traded content, relative to the price of machinery, and yield a
negative relationship between p'/p m and p'/CPI.  Note that in the machinery price equation, the
coefficients  on both variables are negative, in line with this reasoning. The terms of trade coefficient  is
easily significant,  and the capital flow coefficient  is marginally  significant. In other specifications  which
extended  the sample  size and tried other slightly  different measures  of capital flows, the terms of trade
was always significant, while the capital flow variable was sometimes insignificant.  The evidence
strongly suggests  that the terms of trade decline played an important  role in explaining  the rise in the
relative price of machinery.
The estimated  coefficients  in table 3 can also be used to split the increase in machinery  prices  into
the part attributable  to the terms of trade and capital flows.  Multiplying  the estimated coefficients  with
the actual changes in the right had side variables, it turns out that the change in the terms of trade
accounts  for 67 percent 100*(40.836)(40.302)/(0.379)  of the machinery  price increase (the denominator
is the change in the fitted value of the dependent  variable), while  the capital flow reduction accounts  for
the remaining  third.
21The model so far has allowed  capital flows to affect investment  only indirectly; that is, through
their effect on prices. Alternatively,  a reduction in foreign  capital inflows may shift the domestic  saving
function  to the left and cause a simultaneous  rise in domestic interest  rates and a reduction  in investment.
In such a model capital flows would have a direct effect on investment  even after controlling  for other
relative  price movements. However,  adding  the capital  flow variable  to the estimated  investment  function
yields  a small and insignificant  coefficient,  0.0025 (0.0178). Thus the data do not support the view that
the capital flow reduction directly depressed investment  after controlling  for the effect of relative price
movements.' 8
7. Evidence  with Annual Investment  Data.
To assess the generality  of the results both across time and for larger investment  aggregates,  this
section  exan ines  regressions  using total investment  in Mexico  over a longer time span (1970-1988). The
estimated  equations, reported in table 4, are reduced forms of the model outlined above: investment  is
regressed on the terms of trade, capital inflows, an external interest rate, and other variables to capture
debt problems.  The real investment  data used as the dependent variable are scaled by population  to
control for trend growth. It turns out that scaling by GDP delivers similar results.
The debt crisis variables in the regressions  are the ratio of debt to GDP, and a dummy variable
taking  the value one after 1981. The regressions  use government  consumption  spending  as an instrument
for the debt variable. The reason is to use the part of the variation in the debt variable  that was driven
by government consumption spending rather than investment spending, because the latter may be
spuriously  related with investment. The table shows that this part of the variation  in the debt variable
is positively  associated  with investment  after controlling  for the other  exogenous  variables. This evidence
1' This can be seen as a test for what Borensztein  (1990)  calls the credit rationing  effect.  Note also
that this effect predicts  that domestic  real interest rates should have been higher after the debt crisis than
before. The Mexican  real interest rates used in this paper, which cover the 1981-1985  period, are not
clearly higher after 1982:3 than before.
22therefore does not support the simple notion  that accumulated  debt represents an investment  deterrent.
The table also shows that the simple debt dummy either is not significant  (column 1) or has the wrong
sign (column 5).1" Combining  these results with the above results using the quarterly investment  data,
it seems that the only debt indicator  which  provides evidence  for debt-overhang  effects is the debt dummy
in the quarterly regressions. On balance  the evidence  for this kind of debt effect is not strong.
The evidence  in table 4 for the other kind of debt crisis effect, a demand  compression  due to the
reversal in capital flows, is somewhat  more supportive  but also mixed. This variable  is always  positively
signed as anticipated,  but only significant  when other incorrectly  signed debt or interest  rate variables are
included in the regression.  In column  4, when the terms of trade and the capital flow variable  are alone
in the regression, the terms of trade variable  is significant  while capital flow variable is not.
In contrast, the estimated  terms of trade effect is significant  in table 4, regardless of the other
variables  controlled  for in the regression. To gauge  the size of the estimated  effect, between 1981, when
investment  in Mexico  was at its highest, and 1988, when it was at the lowest level in the recent past, the
log of the investment  variable changed  by -0.725.  During  the sane period, the log of the terms of trade
index  changed  by -0.740.  Using  the estimated  coefficient  of 0.742, the terms of trade effect by itself can
account for about 75 percent (-0.742*0.740/-0.725)  of the investment  decline between 1981 and 1988.
Hence this evidence from annual data supports the earlier evidence  on the importance  of the terms of
trade effect.
8. Conclusions  and discussion.
This paper has developed  and estimated  an investment  model which distinguishes  three ways in
which  the debt crisis and Mexico's  terms of trade decline  could  have affected  investment  in Mexico. The
model  allows the capital flow reversal and the terms of trade reduction to affect aggregate  demand and
19  Coding  the debt dummy  to equal 1.0 after 1982, rather  than 1981,  yields an insignificantcoefficient
on D in the regression in column 5 (0.067, se=0. 182), a significant  coefficient  on the terms of trade
(0.800, se=0.284) and an insignificant  coefficient  on the capital flow variable (0.007, se=0.01 1).
23relative prices, and ultimately to affect investment  through these prices.  The model also allows debt
overhang  effects or uncertainty  effects to depress investment  directly.
One of the main findings from this analysis is that only one of several specifications  provide
evidence  for debt overhang  or unce,tainty  effects. Overall, there is not robust evidence  that this was the
main reason for Mexico's large investment  decline  in the "lost decade" of the 1980s.
The evidence instead supports two main points that have been underemphasized  in the debt
literature. First, the main proximate  cause of the investment  decline was the rise in the relative price of
machinery  between 1981  and 1985. This variable is the most reliable across specifications  in accounting
for the investment  decline.  The argument to explain this rise is based on the fact that machinery is
essentially  a traded good in Mexico. As spending declined in response to the terms of trade decline or
the capital flow reversal, this demand contraction reduced other product prices relative to this price,
depressing investment  demand.
Second,  the decline  in Mexico's international  terms of trade during this period, driven by falling
world oil prices, is probably the most important  ultimate cause of this increase in relative machinery
prices, but the reversal in net capital inflows  to Mexico may also have played an important  role.  The
econometric  evidence  using quarterly data during the 1981-1985  period indicates  that both the terms of
trade reduction  and the capital flow reversal played a role in increasing this relative price.  Calculations
using the estimated  coefficients  and the actual changes in these two variab:es between 1981 and 1985
suggest that about two-thirds of the machinery price increase can be attributed to the terms of trade
decline, and the other third to the capital flow reversal.  But in reduced form regressions  using annual
data over a longer time span, it is unclear whether the capital flow variable is significant.
Finally, it is also worth mentioning  that investment  in two neighboring  economies  which were
also riding the oil boom of  1973-1981,  namely Texas and Louisiana, also fell during the 1981-1986
24period, and that adverse  commodity  price shocks also affected  many  other heavily indebted  countries.0
Therefore, at the very least, the direct role of commodity  price shocks  such as Mexico's oil price decline
in causing low investment  levels in the 1980s  has teen insufficiently  emphasized  in the literature on the
effects of the international  debt crisis.
20  These facts are from Warner (1992).
25Table I
DATA
Variable  Mean  Description  Source
Ijt  47.45  Real Machinery  Investment  Bank  of Mexico
P=  pj,/CPI,  62.94  Value Added Price Index  Indicadores  Econonucos
wj, = w/CPI,  72.25  Real Wage Index  Indicadores  Economicos
P=  PI,/CPT,  3.71  Price Index for Machinery  Indicadores  Economicos
CF,  0.34  Net Capital Inflows  Indicadores  Economicos
r.  -10.79  Real Interest Rate  Indicadores  Economicos
LIBOR,  11.84  Nominal LIBOR Interest Rate  DRI
pxVPMt  78.87  Terms of Trade Index  Bank  of Mexco
D,  0.35  Dummy Variable  Indicating  -
Debt Crisis (= I if t> 82:3)
MEXB,  81.35  Price of a Mexican  New York  Stock  Exchange
Government  Bond
MEXF,  4.35  Price of Mexico Fund  New York  Stock  Exchange
MEXCW,  47.29  Index of Mexico's  Institudonal  Investor
Creditworthiness
The  j index ranges across sectors: for the investment  sub-sample  in the regressions,  j = 1,..,42; for prices
and wages  j = 1,..,9.  The matching  scheme, reported in the appendix, is not one-for-one.
The time index is quarterly, t=  1981:1,..,1985:4.
MEXCW is published  bi-annually;  quarterly data was obtained by linear interpolation.
Other measures  of the real domestic  interest rate, r, were used in the regressions but not reported above.
The index numbers were not scaled to a common base year because the relevant regressions were
estimated in logs.
26Table 2
Instrumental  Variables  Estimates  of Equation (16)
Dependent  Variable:  In of Real Investment, In()
Independent  Variable  Estimated  Coefficients  (Standard  Errors)
Ln(p),  1.01  1.90  0.60  0.78  1.14
(0.53)  (0.83)  (0.46)  (0.41)  (0.41)
Ln(w)j,  0.63  -3.20  2.13  1.00  -0.01
(1.21)  (2.66)  (0.72)  (0.86)  (0.76)
Ln(p'),  -3.20  4.75  -1.68  -2.58  -3.18
(1.30)  (1.85)  (0.78)  (0.79)  (1.62)
-t  -.0037  -.0102  .0008  -.0030  -.0045
(.0027)  (.0048)  (.0026)  (.0019)  (.0014)
D,  - -0.83  - -
(0.38)
Ln(MEXBX  - - -0.43  -
(0.30)
Ln(MEXF),  - - - 0.08
(0.11)
Ln(MEXCW),  - - - - 0.38
(1.05)
R 2 0.50  0.37  0.51  0.51  0.49
SE  1.02  1.07  1.00  1.01  1.02
DW  1.63  1.58  1.67  1.64  1.62
N-K  790  790  790  790  790
The instruments  are the log of the terms of trade, the capital inflow  variable, and the LIBOR  interest  rate.
The endogenous  variables are the wage, the price of machinery  and the domestic  real interest  rate.  The
error structure allows  for sector-specific  error variances, estimated in a first-stage  regression. This table
does not report the separate intercepts estimated for  each sector nor the coefficients on quarterly
dummies.
27Table 3
OLS Estimates  of Equations  (17) to (19)
(Robust Standard  Errors in Parentheses)
Independent  Variables  Dependent  Variables
Ln(pbar),  Ln(wbarX  Ln(p'),
pVpm  -0.051  1.057*  -0.836*
(0.163)  (0.339)  (0.265)
CF,  0.002  0.007  -0.026
(0.007)  (0.018)  (0.014)
R 2 0.040  0.642  0.734
The reported  standard  errors are robust to quite general  forms of serial correlation  and heteroscedasticity.
They follow Wooldridge  (1989), which proposes a computationally  simple procedure.  The sample for
all regressions  is quarterly, 1981:1  to 1985:4. Statistical  significance  at the 5 percent level is indicated
by a * next to the estimated  coefficient.
28Table 4
Estimates  of the Reduced  Form using Annual Data
and Total Investment
Dependent  Variable: In of Real Per-Capita Investment, ln(I)
Independent  Variable  Estimated  Coefficients  (Standard  Errors)
In(pVp'o  0.624  0.742  0.621  0.742  0.956
(0.300)  (0.202)  (0.207)  (0.229)  (0.211)
CFt  0.024  0.031  0.025  0.004  0.042
(0.017)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.015)
rus,  0.047  0.031  0.053
(0.038)  (0.022)  (0.022)
ln(DEBT/GDP),  0.217  0.220  -
(0.108)  (0.951)
D,  -0.202  - - - 0.580
(0.439)  (0.218)
R2 0.673  0.691  0.620  0.503  0.640
SE  0.130  0.126  0.139  0.158  0.135
DW  2.090  2.126  0.878  0.743  1.215
N-K  11  12  15  16  15
The terms of trade and capital flow variables are annual version of the quarterly variables used earlier
in this paper.  Of the other new variables, rust  is the U.S. 10 year t-bond rate, DEBT/GDP is Mexico's
total debt in dollars, multiplied by the average peso/dollar exchange rate,  and divided by nominal
Mexican  GDP (source:  World  Debt Tables,  World  Bank, and Indicadores  Economicos,  Bank of Mexico).
Dt is a dummy equal to one after (and including) 1982.  The regressions in the first two columns  use
current and lagged  government  consumption  expenditures  as an instrument  for the DEBT/GDP  variable;
the other regressions  are OLS. The sample is 1970-1988  except when  the debt variable is used, in which
case it is 1972-1988.
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